We show that the problem of finding an optimal bundle-pricing for a single additive buyer is #P-hard, even when the distributions have support size 2 for each item and the optimal solution is guaranteed to be a simple one: the seller picks a price for the grand bundle and a price for each individual item; the buyer can purchase either the grand bundle at the given price or any bundle of items at their total individual prices. We refer to this simple and natural family of pricing schemes as discounted item-pricings. In addition to the hardness result, we show that when the distributions are i.i.d. with support size 2, a discounted item-pricing can achieve the optimal revenue obtainable by lottery-pricings and it can be found in polynomial time.
Introduction
One ubiquitous practice used by retailers when selling their inventories is to offer discounts for bundles of items to encourage customers to spend more money, for example a combo of a toothpaste and a toothbrush priced lower than the total price when one buys them separately. In this paper we formally study practices like the above and consider the Optimal Bundle-pricing problem where an additive buyer is interested in n heterogeneous items offered by a seller. While the buyer's values for the items are unknown, the seller has access to a product distribution F = F 1 × · · · × F n from which the valuations v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) of the buyer for the n items are drawn, where each F i is a discrete distribution given explicitly as input. The seller offers a finite menu M of bundles to the buyer, with each entry of the menu consisting of a subset (bundle) T ⊆ [n] of the items and the price π T at which it is sold. Given a menu M , the buyer either buys the bundle T ∈ M that maximizes her utility i∈T v i − π T or nothing if the utility of every bundle offered in M is negative 1 . Note that the seller does not necessarily need to list explicitly the menu of all bundles offered, but may specify it implicitly in a succinct manner. For example, in the case of simple item-pricing without any discounts for bundles, the seller needs only to specify the n item prices; the induced menu consists of all 2 n subsets of items, each having a price equal to the sum of prices of the items in the subset.
The Optimal Bundle-pricing problem refers to finding a menu of bundles that maximizes the seller's expected revenue (i.e. the expected price π T the buyer pays) when v ∼ F. This is known to be equivalent to the problem of finding a revenue-optimal truthful deterministic mechanism for the same setting. If one extends bundle-pricings by also offering lotteries, which is known as the Optimal Lottery-pricing problem 2 , then the problem becomes equivalent to that of finding a revenue-optimal truthful randomized mechanism. We define the two problems formally in Section 2 and use SREV(F), DREV(F), and REV(F) to denote the optimal expected revenue (nondecreasing from left to right) achievable by selling items separately, bundlepricings, and lottery-pricings.
Both the Bundle-pricing and Lottery-pricing problems have been studied intensively during the past decade [Tha04, GHK + 05, Bri08, CHK07, CHMS10, CD11, CMS10, BCKW10, Pav10, WT14, BILW14, DDT14, DDT12, DDT13, DDT15, HN12, MV06, Rub16, LY13, Yao15] . Recently much effort has been devoted to understanding the power and limitations of "simple" solutions, that is, menus that can be described succinctly in a natural way. Some of the examples include (i) selling all items separately, (ii) selling the grand bundle consisting of all items only, and (iii) partition mechanisms, where one partitions the items into disjoint groups, each with its own price, and sells the groups separately. While it is known that none of these solutions is optimal in general among deterministic (or randomized) mechanisms, there has been substantial work studying basic questions for each of these kinds of simple solutions, including the following: How does the revenue achievable by these solutions compare with the optimal (deterministic or randomized) revenue? What are conditions under which these simple solutions are optimal? Can we compute the optimal solution of each type?
In case (i) of selling the items separately, we know how to compute efficiently the optimal item pricing: each item is assigned separately its optimal price following Myerson's theory [Mye81] . In cases (ii) and (iii) of the grand bundle and partition mechanisms, the problem of finding an optimal solution is intractable (#P-hard [DDT12] and NP-hard [Rub16] respectively). However, the fact that it is hard to find an optimal solution of a certain type (grand bundle or partition mechanism) in an instance does not mean that one cannot easily find better solutions that are not of this type. Thus, the central question remains: Is there an 1 Ties in utility are broken in favor of a bundle with higher price (and value). 2 In the lottery-pricing problem, the seller offers a menu of lotteries, each of which is of the form (x, π), where π is its price and x = (x1, . . . , xn) has xi ∈ [0, 1] as the probability of the buyer receiving item i ∈ [n] if this lottery is purchased. efficient algorithm that computes an optimal bundle-pricing? At least, is there such an algorithm when there is a simple optimal solution?
In this paper we resolve these questions in the negative. We show that it is hard to compute an optimal bundle-pricing, and this holds even when the optimal solution is guaranteed to have a very simple structure: separate item pricing along with the grand bundle. We call this discounted item-pricing. Each item is offered at a price π i and the grand bundle is offered at a price π. The buyer can choose to buy the grand bundle at π or any subset T ⊆ [n] at i∈T π i , whichever brings the highest (nonnegative) utility. While a discounted item-pricing offers exponentially many bundles to the buyer, it has a succinct representation by n + 1 numbers and is easy to implement in practice.
As a by-product of our proofs, we also resolve in the negative the question of whether there is a 'nice' characterization (an easy-to-check necessary and sufficient condition) of when separate item-pricing is optimal, i.e., whether it achieves the maximum revenue among all deterministic mechanisms or whether bundling helps. The same applies to the grand bundle (and to partition mechanisms as well), i.e., there are no easy-to-check conditions that characterize the optimality of the grand bundle mechanism (under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions).
Discounted item-pricings are natural simple solutions, corresponding to the usual practice of having individual item prices with a discount for a bulk purchase. They include the possibility of offering the best of either only the grand bundle or only the items separately. The latter was studied by Babaioff et al. [BILW14] where they proved that max{SREV(F), BREV(F)} ≥ (1/6) · REV(F) for any product distribution F, with BREV(F) being the optimal revenue achievable by selling the grand bundle of all the items. This result implies that discounted item-pricings can extract at least 1/6th of the revenue that the best randomized mechanism can achieve. We show that in some cases, discounted item-pricings can in fact achieve the optimal revenue.
Our Results
We obtain both algorithmic and hardness results based on discounted item-pricings. First we show that when the input distributions F 1 , . . . , F n are i.i.d. and have support size 2, the optimal revenue REV(F) from lottery-pricings (randomized mechanisms) can always be achieved by a discounted item-pricing, which can be computed efficiently in polynomial time.
with support size 2 ({a, b} and a < b), REV(F) can always be achieved by a discounted item-pricing where the grand bundle is priced at kb+(n−k)a for some k ∈ [0 : n] and each item is priced at b. Moreover, the parameter k can be found in polynomial time.
Our main result shows that it is #P-hard to find an optimal bundle-pricing. Although in general an optimal solution may be highly complex (e.g., the optimal menu may consist of exponentially many bundles without a succinct description), our #P-hardness result holds for instances that are guaranteed to have a very simple solution. Thus, the constructed instances have the property that either solution (i) or (ii) is guaranteed to be optimal, but it is #P-hard to determine which of the two is better. Note that in general, item pricing is also a (degenerate) special case of discounted item-pricing (by setting the price of the grand bundle equal to the sum of all item prices). In the above case, solution (i) can also be equivalently replaced by the grand bundle solution that simply offers only the grand bundle at the sum of low values of all items. The theorem has a number of immediate corollaries. 1. Given a product distribution F, compute DREV(F).
Given a product distribution F and valuation v, compute the bundle bought at v in any optimal menu of bundles.
We remark finally that all the hardness results hold if the number of items is unbounded. For a constant number of items, we obtain a polynomial-time algorithm, although the polynomial grows with the number of items. 
Related Work
The seminal work of Myerson [Mye81] completely settles the case of selling a single item, by giving a computationally efficient and deterministic mechanism that maximizes the expected revenue among all possible, randomized or deterministic, mechanisms. The more general multi-dimensional setting, however, is inherently more difficult. Unlike the Myerson's setting, randomization improves revenue when there are many items for sale, even if there is a single unit-demand [Tha04] or additive buyer [MV06] . It is also known that the optimal menu of lotteries may have exponential size [CDO + 15, HN13]. Furthermore, under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions, recent results rule out the existence of computationally efficient algorithms that implement a truthful revenue-maximizing deterministic or randomized mechanism for a unit-demand buyer [CDP + 14, CDO + 15, GHK + 05, Bri08], or a randomized mechanism for an additive buyer [DDT14] .
Those settings however do not include the most common scenario of giving deterministic discounts for bundles of items that we described earlier in the introduction; the corresponding setting for which is that of a deterministic mechanism for an additive buyer. Most of the work for this setting so far focuses on approximation. Hart and Nisan [HN12] studied two simple deterministic mechanisms for product distributions: selling items separately or selling the grand bundle only. They showed that selling items separately and grand bundling are respectively Ω(1/ log 2 n) and Ω(1/ log n) approximations of the optimal revenue achievable by any (possibly randomized) mechanism (later improved by Li and Yao [LY13] to Ω(1/ log n) for both schemes, which is known to be tight [HN12] ). While neither of these two schemes can achieve by itself a constant factor approximation, Babaioff et al. [BILW14] showed that the better of selling separately and grand bundling gives a (1/6)-approximation. [Yao15] introduced a new approach for reducing the k-item n-bidder problem to the k-item 1-bidder setting and gave a deterministic mechanism that yields at least a constant fraction of the optimal revenue for the more general k-item n-bidder setting.
On the other hand, hardness results for the Optimal Bundle-pricing problem are limited. Rubinstein [Rub16] proved that finding an optimal revenue maximizing partition mechanism is strongly NP-hard and Daskalakis et al. [DDT12] proved that finding the revenue maximizing price for selling the grand bundle is #P-hard. However, these results are for restrictions of the problem that impose a very specific menu structure, and the original problem remained open before this work.
We also note that there is extensive work studying unit-demand buyers (e.g. [CDP + 14, CDO + 15, GHK + 05, Bri08, CHK07, CHMS10, CD11, CMS10, BCKW10, Pav10, WT14]). Besides the papers cited earlier that address the complexity of an optimal mechanism in that context, the rest of the work, which mostly concerns special cases or approximation, is not directly related to the topic of the present paper.
Preliminaries
Let D i be the support of F i , and
denotes the probability of v drawn from F.
We first define REV(F), the optimal revenue obtainable by a lottery-pricing, by formulating it as a linear program with n + 1 variables associated with each valuation v ∈ D: x v,1 , . . . , x v,n and π v , where x v,i denotes the probability of the buyer receiving item i in the lottery she obtains when her valuation is v and π v denotes its price. We write x v = (x v,1 , . . . , x v,n ) to denote the allocation probability vector for v. The LP then maximizes the expected revenue: v∈D π v · Pr[v] subject to:
2. For each v ∈ D, the utility is nonnegative:
3. For all w, v ∈ D, w does not envy the lottery of v:
We refer to this LP as the standard LP for REV(F).
Sometimes (e.g., in Section 4), it is more convenient to replace π v by the utility variable u v . The LP maximizes the same expected revenue:
subject to the following (slightly simpler) constraints:
2. For all w, v ∈ D, w does not envy the lottery of v:
We refer to this LP as the standard LP (utility version) for REV(F).
On the other hand, the optimal revenue DREV(F) obtainable by a bundle-pricing is captured by the same objective function and linear constraints, except that x v,i takes values in {0, 1}. We refer to this integer program as the standard IP for DREV(F).
IID with Support Size 2
We establish Theorem 1.1 in this section. Let F 1 , . . . , F n be i.i.d. distributions with support size 2. Without loss of generality we can assume that the support is {1, b} with b > 1. (If the support is {0, b} the problem is trivial: the optimal revenue can be achieved by offering every item at price b; if the support is {a, b} with 0 < a < b, then we can equivalently rescale it to {1, b/a}.) Let p ∈ (0, 1) be the probability that an item takes value b, and 1 − p that it takes 1. We let P i denote the probability of v ∼ F having i items at value b and n − i at 1, for each i ∈ [0 : n]. That is,
The following lemma for P i 's is crucial. We delay its proof to the end of this section.
is negative for all i : 0 ≤ i < k and is nonnegative for all i :
Let k ∈ [0 : n] be an integer that satisfies Lemma 3.1, which is unique and can be computed in polynomial time. We use S * to denote the following discounted item-pricing:
The grand bundle [n] is offered at kb + n − k and each item is offered individually at b (the latter means that the buyer can buy any bundle T ⊆ [n] at price |T |b).
Given S * , the behavior of the buyer is as follows. If a valuation vector has k or more items at b then the buyer buys the grand bundle at kb + n − k; otherwise it buys all the items that have value b. The expected revenue R * of the discounted item-pricing S * is then
It is clear that given k, R * can be computed in polynomial time.
To finish the proof of Theorem 1.1, we show that S * achieves the optimal revenue Rev(F).
with support size 2 and k satisfies Lemma 3.1.
We start with some preparation for the proof of Lemma 3.2. First recall that when distributions are i.i.d., Daskalakis and Weinberg [DW12] showed that there always exists an optimal solution to the standard LP for REV(F) (we use the price version in this section) that is "symmetric": For any permutation σ over [n] with σ(v) = w (i.e. v σ(i) = w i for all i ∈ [n]), we always have σ(x v ) = x w and π v = π w , i.e., the lotteries bought at v and w are the same under the permutation σ. Based on that, one can significantly reduce the number of variables for the i.i.d. support-size 2 case, and we refer to the new LP described below as the symmetric LP for REV(F).
The symmetric LP has 3n + 1 variables: x i , for i = 1, . . . , n, is the probability of getting an item with value b in v when the valuation v has i items at b (and n − i items at 1); y i , for i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1, is the probability of getting an item with value 1 when the valuation has i items at b; finally, π i for i = 0, 1, . . . , n is the price of the lottery for a valuation with i items at b. The symmetric LP maximizes the expected revenue:
n i=0 π i · P i subject to the same constraints of the standard LP after replacing π v by π ℓ when v has ℓ items at b and x v,i by x ℓ if v i = b and by y ℓ if v i = 1. It is not hard to see that the number of distinct constraints left after the replacement is polynomial in n and thus, the symmetric LP can be solved exactly in polynomial time. By [DW12] , the optimal value of the symmetric LP is REV(F).
We are now ready to prove Lemma 3.2.
Proof of Lemma 3.2.
Since R * is the expected revenue of S * , it suffices to show Rev(F) ≤ R * . For this purpose we will relax the symmetric LP for REV(F) and show that its optimal value is at most R * . In the relaxed LP we only keep the following constraints of the symmetric LP:
2. π 0 ≤ ny 0 (i.e., the utility at the all-1 vector is nonnegative); 
Note that when i = 1, x 0 appears on the RHS with coefficient 0; when i = n, y n appears on the LHS with coefficient 0. For convenience we introduce x 0 = y n = 0 as dummy variables that never appear in the relaxed LP but help simplify the presentation of these constraints.
Since all of them are part of the symmetric LP, the optimal value of the relaxed LP is at least REV(F). In the rest of the proof we show that the optimal value of the relaxed LP is at most R * . To this end we use the constraints above to upperbound each π i using x and y variables. For i = 0 we use π 0 ≤ ny 0 . For each j ∈ [n] we have from constraints (2) in the relaxed LP that:
Summing these inequalities for all j = 1, . . . , i, we get after some cancellations:
Plugging in π 0 ≤ ny 0 , we have for each i ∈ [n]:
Replacing in the objective function i P i · π i each π i by its upper bound, we get a linear form in the x i 's, i ∈ [n], and y i 's, i ∈ [0 : n − 1], which upperbounds the value of the relaxed LP (note that x 0 and y n are dummy variables that do not really appear in any constraint). For each i ∈ [n], the coefficient of x i in the linear form is bi · P i , thus this term is maximized if we set
From the choice of k ∈ [0 : n] and Lemma 3.1, we have for all i ∈ [0 : n − 1]: The coefficient of y i is negative if i < k, and is nonnegative if i ≥ k. Therefore, the linear form is maximized when we set y i = 0 for all i < k and y i = 1 for all i ≥ k. Applying these substitutions in the linear form, the upper bound on the value of the LP becomes (note that (n − i)
This finishes the proof of the lemma.
It remains to prove Lemma 3.1. We start with the following lemma.
Proof. We use induction on n − i. Basis: n − i = 1, i.e. i = n − 1. The left-hand side is
p . Therefore, the left-hand side is equal to
where the last inequality holds by the induction hypothesis.
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 3.1:
Proof of Lemma 3.1. We let k be the smallest i ∈ [0 : n] such that (1) is nonnegative (k is well defined as (1) is 0 when i = n). To prove that (1) is nonnegative for all i ≥ k, it suffices to show that
is monotonically increasing for i from 0 to n − 1. Fix an i ∈ [n − 1]. Our goal is to show that
we can rewrite the left-hand side as
which is positive by Lemma 3.3. Therefore, the desired inequality holds.
Hardness of the Optimal Bundle-Pricing Problem
We prove Theorem 1.2 in this section. The plan is to reduce from the following #P-hard decision problem called COMP introduced in [CDO + 15]. The input consists of three parts: 1) a set B of n nonnegative integers B = {b 1 , . . . , b n } between 0 and 2 n (we assume without loss of generality that
of size |W | = n/2 (assume without loss of generality that n is even) and we use w to denote i∈W b i ; and 3) an integer t. The question is to decide whether the number of S ⊂ [n] such that |S| = n/2 and i∈S b i ≥ w is at least t or at most t − 1. While COMP was shown to be #P-hard in [CDO + 15], we need here the same problem with the following two extra conditions on the two input sets B and W , which we will refer to as COMP * :
These extra conditions will come in handy in the reduction below.
#P-Hardness of COMP *
We show that COMP * is #P-hard via a polynomial-time reduction from COMP. Let (B, W, t) be an input to the original COMP problem, where
with |W | = n/2, and w = i∈W b i . We first construct from B a new set B ′ of 4n integers between 0 and 2 4n :
2. B ′ contains 2 4n (as the largest integer in B ′ ) and 3n/2 copies of 2 3n ;
The new set W ′ contains 2n integers from B ′ : the 3n/2 copies of 2 3n and each of 2 2n + b i , i ∈ W . Let
We show that B ′ and W ′ satisfy the two extra conditions. For the first part note that b∈S b > w ′ for any subset S that contains the largest integer 2 4n . On the other hand, if S is a 2n-subset of W ′ that does not contain 2 4n but contains at least one 0, then we have (using
Let S be a 2n-subset that satisfies b∈S b ≥ w ′ . Then either i) S contains 2 4n , or ii) S contains all the 3n/2 copies of 2 3n and a subset of n/2 integers 2 2n + b i , with the sum of the latter being at least (n/2)·2 2n +w. This then implies that (B, W, t) is a yes-instance if and only if (B ′ , W ′ , t ′ ) is a yes-instance. It follows that COMP * is also #P-hard.
The Reduction
We now present the reduction from COMP * to the optimal bundle-pricing problem.
Given an input instance (B, W, t) of COMP * (with B and W satisfying the extra conditions) we define an instance F of optimal bundle-pricing with n + 1 items and support size 2. We shall refer to the first n items as item i for i ∈ [n] and refer to the last item as the special item. Let
(hence a i ∈ [0, 2 n δ] and is an integer multiple of δ). Then item i is supported on {1, h i + 1}. The probability of h i + 1 is p and the probability of 1 is 1 − p. Let c = wδ, α = (n/2)h + c, σ = 1 p n and τ = σ σ + α (hence c ∈ [0, (n/2)2 n δ] and is an integer multiple of δ). The special item is supported on {σ, σ + α}. The probability of σ + α is τ − ǫ and the probability of σ is 1 − τ + ǫ = (α/(σ + α)) + ǫ for some ǫ (which is not necessarily positive) to be specified at the end of the proof; for now we only require that |ǫ| = o(1/σ). Note that since σ ≫ α, the probability τ − ǫ of σ + α is very close to 1, and the probability 1 − τ + ǫ of σ is positive but very close to 0. This finishes the description of the bundle pricing instance F (except the choice of the parameter ǫ which we will set at the end).
Plan of the Proof
Our plan for the proof is the following. In Section 4.4, we introduce some notation and define two simple bundle-pricings (Solution 1 and 2), as feasible solutions to the standard IP for DREV(F), both of which are discounted item-pricings. Most of the work lies in Section 4.5, where we show that whenever |ǫ| = o(1/σ), one of these two solutions is the unique optimal solution to the standard IP and achieves DREV(F). This is done by relaxing the standard IP and showing that one of these two solutions is the unique optimal solution to the relaxed IP. As they are both feasible to the standard IP, we conclude that one of them is uniquely optimal for the standard IP.
Finally, we set ǫ carefully (with |ǫ| = o(1/σ) as promised) in Section 4.6 to show that Solution 2 is strictly better if the (B, W, t) used in the construction of F is a yes-instance of problem COMP * , and Solution 2 is strictly better if it is a no-instance. This finishes the proof of Theorem 1.2.
Notation and two simple solutions
For convenience, we will use a subset S ⊆ [n] to denote a valuation vector over the first n items, where i ∈ S (or i / ∈ S) means that item i takes the high value h i + 1 (or low value 1). We will also use (S, σ + α) (or (S, σ)) to denote a full valuation vector over all the n + 1 items in which the special item has the high value σ + α (or low value σ).
Given S ⊆ [n], we write Pr[S] to denote p |S| (1 − p) n−|S| ; given an integer i ∈ [0 : n], we write
. We also use Pr[S, σ] and Pr[S, σ + α] to denote the probabilities of valuations (S, σ) and (S, σ + α):
We use the standard IP for DREV(F) (the utility version) but rename the variables as follows. For each S ⊆ [n] we use x S,i ∈ {0, 1} to denote the variable for item i in valuation (S, σ) for each i ∈ [n], z S ∈ {0, 1} to denote the variable for the special item, and u S ≥ 0 to denote the utility. For each S ⊆ [n], we use x ′ S,i ∈ {0, 1} to denote the variable for item i in valuation (S, σ + α), z ′ S ∈ {0, 1} to denote the variable for the special item, and u ′ S ≥ 0 to denote the utility. The two simple bundle-pricings we are interested in are the following: Solution 1: Offer the grand bundle at σ + n, or (equivalently) offer each item at its low value.
Solution 2:
The discounted item-pricing where the grand bundle is offered at σ + α + n and each individual item is offered at its high value. As discussed in the introduction, this means that the buyer can buy either the grand bundle at σ + α + n or any bundle of items at the sum of their high values. When this menu is offered, the buyer buys the grand bundle if its utility is positive (since her utility from buying items priced at their high values can never be positive) and buys the bundle of items at their high values (if any) if the utility from the grand bundle is negative. For the case when the utility from the grand bundle is 0, the buyer still gets the grand bundle since it always gives a higher revenue.
These two bundle-pricings induce two feasible solutions to the standard IP:
1. In Solution 1, every valuation (S, σ) and (S, σ + α) buys the grand bundle. So we have for each
Regarding the utilities we have u S = i∈S h i and u ′ S = α + i∈S h i .
In Solution 2 we have 1) for each S ⊆ [n]
and i ∈ [n], x ′ S,i = z ′ S = 1 and u ′ S = i∈S h i ; 2) for each S ⊆ [n] with i∈S h i ≥ α, we have x S,i = z S = 1 for all i ∈ [n], u S = i∈S h i − α; 3) for each S ⊆ [n] with i∈S h i < α, we have x S,i = 1 for each i ∈ S, x S,i = 0 for each i / ∈ S, z S = 0, and u S = 0. Given our choice of parameters (i.e. h ≫ a i , c), every S with |S| > n/2 satisfies case 2) and every S with |S| < n/2 satisfies case 3). A set S with |S| = n/2 satisfies case 2) if we have i∈S a i ≥ c (equivalently, i∈S b i ≥ w) and satisfies case 3) otherwise. This is the connection with COMP * that we will explore in the reduction.
As discussed in the plan, we introduce a relaxation of the standard IP that only contains a subset of its constraints and refer to it as the relaxed IP. It contains the following constraints:
2. For each S = ∅, (S, σ + α) does not envy (∅, σ + α):
For each S ⊆ [n], (S, σ) does not envy
(∅, σ + α): u S ≥ u ′ ∅ + i∈S h i · x ′ ∅,i − α · z ′ ∅ .
For each pair of T, S with T ⊂ S ⊆ [n], (S, σ) does not envy (T, σ):
The objective function of the relaxed IP is the same expected revenue:
One of the two simple solutions is optimal
Our goal is the following lemma about optimal solutions to the relaxed IP:
Lemma 4.1. In an optimal solution to the relaxed IP, if z ∅ = 1, then it must be Solution 1; if z ∅ = 0, then it must be Solution 2.
As both solutions are feasible for the standard IP, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 4.2. Either Solution 1 or 2 is the unique optimal solution to the standard IP.
We start the proof of Lemma 4.1 with a few simple observations. Proof. The part of x ′ S,i = 1 for all S = ∅ and i ∈ [n] and z ′ S = 1 for all S = ∅ is trivial as they do not appear in the constraints of the relaxed IP but appear with a positive coefficient in the objective function. For z ′ ∅ , note that it only appears on the right hand side with a negative coefficient. Thus, if z ′ ∅ = 0 in a feasible solution, we can switch it to 1 and the new solution remains feasible but the expected revenue goes up strictly. The same argument works for x S,i for all S ⊆ [n] and i ∈ S.
Next we show that x ′ ∅,i = 1 for all i ∈ [n] in any optimal solution to the relaxed IP.
Lemma 4.4. In an optimal solution to the relaxed IP,
Proof. Assume for contradiction that x ′ ∅,i = 0 for i ∈ I and I is nonempty. Then we make the following changes to obtain a new solution: i) We change x ′ ∅,i from 0 to 1 for each i ∈ I;
ii) For each S = ∅, we increase u ′ S by i∈S∩I h i ;
iii) For each S ⊆ [n], we replace u S by the maximum of the original u S and u ′ ∅ + i∈S h i − α (by doing this the new u S can go up by at most i∈S∩I h i because of constraints (4)).
We first verify that the new solution remains feasible and then show that its expected revenue is strictly better than that of the original solution. For its feasibility, constraints in (2) and (4) are trivial. (3) for S holds trivially if u S remains the same. Otherwise u S = u ′ ∅ + i∈S h i − α and thus,
For 5), the constraint for T ⊂ S holds trivially if u T remains the same. If u T goes up, we have
. This shows that the new solution is also feasible. Finally, comparing the two solutions, the net gain of expected revenue in the new one is at least
as by our choice of parameters the first term is close to |I| and the second term is close to |I|/2. The second part of the lemma follows trivially since u ′ S appears only in the LHS of constraints (2) when S = ∅ and appears in the objective function with a negative coefficient.
So far we have shown in an optimal solution to the relaxed IP that every entry in x ′ and z ′ is 1 and the only unsettled variable in u ′ is u ′ ∅ , with u ′ S = u ′ ∅ + i∈S h i for all S = ∅. (For a sanity check, note that these conditions hold in Solution 1 and 2.) Next we prove the first case of Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.5. In an optimal solution to the relaxed IP, if z ∅ = 1, then it must be Solution 1.
Proof. Assuming z ∅ = 1, we have u ′ ∅ ≥ u ∅ + α from constraints (3). Next we show that x ∅,i = 1 for all i ∈ [n]. Assume for contradiction that x ∅,i = 0 for i ∈ I and I is nonempty. Then we make the following changes to obtain a new solution: i) We change x ∅,i from 0 to 1 for every i ∈ I; and ii) For each S = ∅, we change u S to be the maximum of the original u S and u ∅ + i∈S h i (by doing this u S can go up by at most i∈S∩I h i due to constraints (5) for T = ∅). We first verify that the new solution is also feasible and then show that its expected revenue is strictly higher than that of the old solution. For its feasibility, constraints in (2) and (4) are trivial. For (3), the constraint for S ⊆ [n] is trivial if u S stays the same. Otherwise, u S = u ∅ + i∈S h i and RHS of (3) 
The constraint (5) for T ⊂ S is trivial if u T remains the same. Otherwise, we have u T = u ∅ + i∈T h i and u S ≥ u ∅ + i∈S h i . Thus, u S − u T ≥ i∈S\T h i · x T,i . This finishes the proof of feasibility.
Next the net gain of expected revenue in the new solution is at least
following the same argument used in the previous lemma. We conclude that
Finally, given that x ∅,i = 1 for all i ∈ [n] and u ∅ ≥ 0, we have u S ≥ i∈S h i , u ′ ∅ ≥ α and
Comparing it with Solution 1, a) the utility of every valuation of this solution is at least as large as that of Solution 1; and b) every allocation variable x S,i , x ′ S,i , z S and z ′ S in Solution 1 is 1 (the maximum possible). Thus, its revenue is no more than that of Solution 1 and in order to be optimal, it must be exactly the same as Solution 1. This finishes the proof of the lemma.
In the rest of this subsection, we consider the more challenging case when z ∅ = 0, and prove the second part of Lemma 4.1 using a sequence of lemmas. First we show that u ′ ∅ = 0 when z ∅ = 0. Lemma 4.6. In any optimal solution to the relaxed IP, if z ∅ = 0 then we have u ′ ∅ = 0. Proof. Assume for contradiction that u ′ ∅ > 0. We show first that u ′ ∅ > 0 implies that u ′ ∅ ≥ δ. For this purpose we fix all the allocation variables to their {0, 1} values in the optimal solution and replacing each u ′ S , S = ∅, using u ′ S = u ′ ∅ + i∈S h i (by Lemma 4.5) to obtain a linear program over the rest of utility variables u S , S ⊆ [n], and u ′ ∅ . The linear program maximizes the objective function (hence these utility variables must have the minimum possible values), subject to the constraints (1), (3), (4), (5) of the relaxed IP (note that constraints (2) Recall that h = 2 2n and δ = 1/2 3n . The problem of finding the optimal utilities becomes a shortest-path problem over 2 n + 2 vertices: the set V plus an extra vertex 0 as the source vertex. The distance from 0 to each vertex in V is set to 0 and the distance from v ′ to v is set to −b if v ≥ v ′ + b is a constraint in the relaxed IP. The optimal value of u ′ ∅ is then the length of the shortest path from vertex 0 to vertex u ′ ∅ with the sign changed. Hence u ′ ∅ is a sum of at most 2 n + 1 edge weights (−b), with each of them being an integer multiple c 1 of h plus an integer multiple c 2 of δ (with |c 2 | ≤ O(n2 n )). As a result, u ′ ∅ is of the form d 1 h + d 2 δ where d 1 and d 2 are both integers and |d 2 | = O(n2 2n ). For u ′ ∅ to be positive, we have either
Now we modify the given solution to obtain a new solution. We then show that the new solution is also feasible and its expected revenue is strictly higher. Let D denote the set of all subsets S ⊂ [n] with i∈S h i < α, and let U denote the set of all S ⊆ [n] with i∈S h i ≥ α. Then we modify the solution as follows: i) We set x S,i = 0 and z S = 0 for all S ∈ D and i / ∈ S;
ii) We change u ′ ∅ to 0 and u ′ S to i∈S h i ;
iii) For each S ∈ D we change u S to 0; For each S ∈ U we change u S to i∈S h i − α (which is nonnegative by the definition of U and can only go down compared to the old solution by constraints (4) using x ′ ∅,i = 1 from Lemma 4.4 and z ′ ∅ = 1 from Lemma 4.3).
Every other entry remains the same as in the original solution.
We first show that the new solution is feasible. Constraints in (2) are trivial. For (3), if S ∈ D, we have u S = 0 and z S = 0 and thus, the RHS is − i∈S h i ≤ 0 = u ′ ∅ ; if S ∈ U , we have u S = i∈S h i − α and thus, the RHS is −α + α · z S ≤ 0 = u ′ ∅ . For constraints in (4), if S ∈ D, we have u S = 0 and the RHS is i∈S h i − α < 0 = u S (by the definition of D); if S ∈ U the RHS is i∈S h i − α = u S . Finally for (5), the constraint is trivial if both S of T are in U , or both of them are in D. The only case left is that S ∈ U and T ∈ D (the other case of S ∈ D and T ∈ U cannot happen as T ⊂ S), in which case the constraint is trivial since u T = 0 and x T,i = 0 for all i / ∈ T . This finishes the feasibility proof. Next we bound the net gain of expected revenue in the new solution. For this purpose we discuss two cases: a) There exists an S with |S| < n/2 (and thus, S ∈ D) such that z S = 1 in the original solution; and b) Every S with |S| < n/2 has z S = 0 in the original solution.
We start with the first case. The existence of such an S implies that u ′ ∅ ≥ Ω(h) in the original solution by constraint (3) . Note that the utility u S for every S does not increase and the utility u ′ S for every S goes down by at least Ω(h). Therefore the expected revenue goes up by at least
For the last term, we plug in
For the second case, we use u ′ ∅ ≥ δ. Let D ′ denote the set of S with |S| < n/2. Since z S = 0 for all S ∈ D ′ in the original solution, the expected revenue goes up by at least
For the last term, we have O(σ) · (1 − τ + ǫ) = O(α) = O(n2 2n ) and Pr[n/2] < 2 n · p n/2 . As a result, their product is much smaller than δ = 1/2 3n as p = O(1/2 2n ). This finishes the proof.
Let D and U be the sets defined in the proof above. We have the following simple corollary: Proof. By constraints (3), for S ∈ D: 0 ≥ u S − i∈S h i + α · z S . Thus, α · z S ≤ i∈S h i < α.
Next we show that if z ∅ = 0 in an optimal solution, then x S,i = 0 for all S ∈ D and i / ∈ S.
Lemma 4.8. In an optimal solution, if z ∅ = 0 then x S,i = 0 for all S ∈ D and i / ∈ S.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that we do not have x T,i = 0 for all sets T ∈ D and i / ∈ T . (For reasons that will become clear later we need special treatments for not only those T at level n/2 but those at level (n/2) − 1 as well.) We use G to denote the set of pairs (T, k) such that |T | < (n/2) − 1, k / ∈ T and x T,k = 1; we use G * to denote the set of pairs (T, k) such that |T | = (n/2) − 1, k / ∈ T , T ∪ {k} ∈ U and x T,k = 1; we use G
S ⊂ [n]
is in E if |S| = n/2, S ∈ U and T ∪ {k} ⊆ S for some pair (T, k) ∈ G ∪ G * .
is in E † if |S| = (n/2) + 1 and satisfies either S = T ∪ {k} for some pair (T, k) ∈ G † 2 or S = T ∪ {k, r} for some pair (T, k) ∈ G † 1 with r being the smallest index not in T ∪ {k}. We need the following simple claim about z S , S ∈ E ∪ E † , in the original solution.
Claim 4.9. We have z S = 0 for every S ∈ E ∪ E † in the original solution.
Proof. For each S ∈ E (with T ∪ {k} ⊆ S for some (T, k) ∈ G ∪ G * ) we have from constraint (5):
and thus, by constraint (3):
which implies that z S = 0 since α ≥ (n/2)h and h ≫ a i .
For each S ∈ E † , if S = T ∪ {k} for some (T, k) ∈ G † 2 , we have u S ≥ h k and by constraint (3):
which implies that z S = 0 since T ∈ D implies that i∈T h i < α.
Finally if S ∈ E † satisfies S = T ∪ {k, r} for some (T, k) ∈ G † 1 , we have u S ≥ h k and thus,
Note that n / ∈ T (by the first condition of B and W and the fact that T ∪ {k} ∈ D), r = n, and T ∪ {r} contains either 1 or 2 (by our choice of r, as the smallest index not in T ∪ {k}). Using the second condition about B and W , we have i∈T ∪{r} h i < α and thus, z S = 1. This finishes the proof.
Claim 4.9 inspires us to derive a new solution by making the following changes in the old one:
ii) For all S ∈ E ∪ E † , change z S from 0 to 1;
iii) For all S ∈ D, change u S to 0; For all S ∈ U , change u S to i∈S h i − α (note that the new u S is nonnegative as S ∈ U and can only go down from the original by constraint (4)).
All other entries remain the same in the new solution.
We first verify that the new solution is feasible and then show that it is strictly better than the old solution. For the feasibility, constraints (2) are trivial. For (3), the constraint is trivial if S ∈ D (since u S = z S = 0); if S ∈ U , we have u S = i∈S h i − α and thus, the RHS is at most 0. For (4), the constraint is trivial if S ∈ D (since the RHS is negative); if S ∈ U , the LHS and RHS are the same. For (5), the constraint is trivial if T ∈ D (since the RHS is 0); otherwise we have both S and T are in U and the constraint follows from u S = i∈S h i − α and u T = i∈T h i − α in the new solution. This finishes the proof of feasibility of the new solution.
Note that each utility variable in the new solution can only go down from that in the old solution. As a result, the net gain of expected revenue in the new solution is at least To see this, we consider two cases: n ∈ T ∪ {k} or n / ∈ T ∪ {k}. For the first case, from the first condition on B and W , every set S of size n/2 that contains T ∪ {k} is in E and is connected with (T, k). For the second case, every set S of size n/2 that contains T ∪ {k, n} is in E and is connected with (T, k). (Here we used the fact that ℓ ≤ n/2 − 2 so T ∪ {k, n} has size no more than n/2, which is why we treated sets of size n/2 − 1 differently throughout the proof.)
As a result, the number of edges between G ℓ and E is at least |G ℓ | but is at most
Therefore, we have
This implies that
Plugging in our choice of σ = 1/p n , we have
when E = ∅. Our argument above also shows that E = ∅ whenever G ∪ G * = ∅. Proof. We show that, when z ∅ = 0, every utility variable in the optimal solution is at least as large as that in Solution 2, and every allocation variable is at most as large as that in Solution 2. So for it to be optimal, it must be exactly the same as Solution 2.
For utilities we first note that u ′ S is the same in both solutions for all S ⊆ [n] since in both we have u ′ ∅ = 0 and u ′ S = i∈S h i . Next for each S ∈ D, we have u S = 0 in Solution 2. Finally, for each S ∈ U we have from constraint (4) that u S ≥ u ′ ∅ + i∈S h i − α = i∈S h i − α in the optimal solution, which is at least as large as u S in Solution 2. For allocation variables, we first have x ′ S,i = z ′ S = 1 in both solutions for all S ⊆ [n] and i ∈ [n]. Next we have x S,i = 1 in both solutions for all S ⊆ [n] and i ∈ S. For each S ∈ D, we have x S,i = z S = 0 in both solutions for all i / ∈ S. Finally for each S ∈ U , we have x S,i = z S = 1 in Solution 2 for all i / ∈ S. This finishes the proof of the lemma.
Finishing the reduction from COMP *
Finally, we show that with an appropriate choice of ǫ (with |ǫ| = o(1/σ) as promised) that can be computed in polynomial time, we have 1) Solution 2 is strictly better than Solution 1 if (B, W, t) is a yes-instance of COMP * ; and 2) Solution 1 is strictly better than Solution 2 if it is a no-instance. The expected revenue of Solution 1 is Rev 1 = n + σ. Let t * be the number of (n/2)-sets S ⊂ [n] with i∈S h i ≥ α (recall that (B, W, t) is a yes-instance if t * ≥ t and is a no-instance if t * ≤ t − 1) and let R be the set of all sets S ⊂ [n] with i∈S h i < α. Then Rev 2 of Solution 2 is
Below we use a = b ± c to denote |a − b| ≤ c. The sum S∈R Pr[S] · i∈S (h i + 1) is equal to
Then Rev 2 is equal to B − Aǫ, where
where A ′ = Θ(σ) is a number that we can compute efficiently. On the other hand, we note for B that Pr[i > n/2] ≤ 2 n p n/2+1 and (n + σ + α) · (1 − τ ) = O(α). As a result, we have
For convenience we write B as B = B ′ + C ′ · t * ± O(α2 n p n/2+1 ), where
can also be computed efficiently. Plugging in τ = σ/(σ + α) and h i = h + a i , we have
Finally we choose ǫ to be (recall t is between 1 and 2 n ; otherwise the problem is trivial)
which can be computed efficiently and satisfies (using
Plugging in our choice of ǫ, we have 
Constant number of Items
In this section we prove Theorem 1.5. Let F = F 1 × · · · × F k be an instance of bundle-pricing for some constant number of items k and assume without loss of generality that |SUPPORT(F i )| = m for all i ∈ [k]. In this case, there are m k possible valuation vectors (a polynomial number), and d = 2 k possible distinct bundles (a constant number). For the rest, we assume two arbitrary orderings, one for the valuation vectors and one for the bundles, and we will use v i to denote the ith valuation vector, and B(j) to denote the jth bundle and p j to denote its price.
We will argue that we can generate in polynomial time a set of price vectors p = (p 1 , . . . , p d ) that includes an optimal one; we can then compute the expected revenue for each of these vectors and pick the best one. To this end, we consider a partitioning of the d-dimensional space of possible price vectors p into cells, such that for all p in the same cell, the buyer has the same behavior for every v i , i.e., buys the same bundle, if any. Consider the following set H of hyperplanes over p. a price vector p in the cell C, can be computed by solving the LP of maximizing j Q C (j) · p j , subject to p belonging to the closure of the cell C, i.e., p satisfying all the weak inequalities corresponding to the bounding hyperplanes of C. By LP theory, the maximum value of the LP is achieved at some vertex; even if the vertex does not belong to C but is in the closure, the corresponding price vector achieves this expected revenue (by the maximum price tie breaking rule). The maximum over all cells C gives the supremum revenue that can be achieved by any price vector. Thus, the supremum revenue is achieved at some vertex, i.e., at the intersection of some d hyperplanes of the set H.
Therefore, we can compute an optimal solution by generating all vertices and picking the best one. For every subset of d = 2 k hyperplanes of H, solve the corresponding linear system to check if the hyperplanes intersect at a unique point p, and if p is nonnegative (if a price is negative then p cannot be optimal). If so, compute the expected revenue of p by examining each valuation v i and determining the bundle selected for v i , if any. Choose among these price vectors p the one that yields the maximum revenue. The set H has a polynomial number of hyperplanes, and the dimension d = 2 k is constant, so we will consider a polynomial number of subsets to generate the set of price vectors p. Since the number of valuations is polynomial, it takes polynomial time to compute the revenue of each vector p. Hence the total time is polynomial. This finishes the proof of Theorem 1.5.
Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the Optimal Bundle-pricing problem. We showed that the problem is intractable (#P-hard) even when the (independent) item distributions have support size 2 and the optimal solution has a very simple form of discounted item-pricing: the seller prices the individual items and offers also the grand bundle at a (possibly) discounted price. Another consequence of the results is that there is no 'nice' (easyto-check) characterization of when separate item pricing, or grand bundling extracts the maximum revenue DREV(F) achievable by any bundle-pricing. On the other hand, we showed that for i.i.d. distributions with support size 2, the maximum revenue REV(F) achievable by any lottery pricing can always be achieved by a discounted item-pricing, and we can compute it in polynomial time.
A number of interesting problems present themselves. First, we know from Babaioff et al. [BILW14] that discounted item-pricing always achieves a constant fraction (at least 1/6th) of the maximum revenue; what is the constant that can always be guaranteed with respect to the deterministic and randomized maximum revenue? Second, we know that we can compute efficiently an optimal item pricing, and it can be shown that we can also compute an (1 − ǫ)-approximately optimal grand bundle price; can we compute efficiently an (1 − ǫ)-approximately optimal discounted item pricing? (We believe this is the case.) Third, besides extending simple item-pricing with the grand bundle, it is more generally natural to offer discounts on disjoint groups of items, as in partition mechanisms. How powerful are such partitioned discounted itempricings, and can we compute efficiently an (1 − ǫ)-approximately optimal solution of this type? Finally, regarding i.i.d. distributions, we know that randomization can increase the revenue for support size 3 in some cases (an example is given by Hart and Nisan [HN12] ). Are simple schemes able to extract (approximately) the maximum revenue DREV(F) achievable by any bundle pricing for general i.i.d. distributions?
